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Article 8

COMMENTS
REAL ESTATE VALUATION IN CONDEMNATION
CASES-THE PLACE FOR THE EXPERT
Every person whose land is taken for public use by eminent
domain proceedings is constitutionally entitled to receive just compensation,1 which has been defined by all courts as fair market
value.2 The history of condemnation proceedings is the history of
the courts' struggle to devise methods of determining the fair
market value of land. The scope of this article is limited to the
importance of land value experts in determining fair market value.
The rules of admissibility of evidence in the Nebraska courts are
at variance with the actual procedures employed by real estate
experts. The purpose of this article is to compare business methods
of land valuation with court methods in condemnation proceedings,
and to suggest modifications in evidentiary rules that will permit
the best use of expert testimony and achieve an equitable result
for both the condemnor and condemnee.
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE EXPERT
The early American courts accepted the English view on admissibility of opinion evidence by experts which required the witness to be skilled and to state the facts on which he based his
opinion.3 Despite this general acceptance the New York court, in
particular, looked unfavorably upon testimony given by real estate
experts.4 Nebraska, in a case of first impression, refused to allow
statements of opinion on value,5 but this position was soon expressly overruled.6 The federal courts also distrusted expert opinion
of value unless the facts upon which the opinion rested were fully
disclosed.7 An often voiced criticism is clearly presented in Roberts
v. New York Elec. Ry.:s
Expert evidence, so-called, or in other words, evidence of the
1 NEB. CONST., art. 1, § 21; U.S. CoNsT., amend. V.
2 5 NiCHOLs, EMNMENT DomAnw § 12.2 (3d ed. 1962).
3
Forbes v. Caruthers, 3 Yeates 527 (Pa. 1803); Harrison v. Rowan, 3
Wash. 580 (C.C. N.J. 1820).

Roberts v. New York Elevated R. R., 128 N.Y. 455, 28 N.E. 486 (1891);
Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N.Y. 507, 49 Am. Rep. 544 (1884); In re Board
of Water Supply, 170 App. Div. 107, 155 N.Y. Supp. 753 (3d Dep't 1915).
5Fremont E. & M.V. R.R. v. Whalen, 11 Neb. 585, 10 N.W. 491 (1881).
8
Republican Valley R.R. v. Arnold, 13 Neb. 485, 14 N.W. 478 (1882).
4

7 E.g., Welch v. TVA, 108 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1939).

8 128 N.Y. 455, 464-65, 28 N.E. 486, 487 (1891).
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mere opinion of witnesses, has been used to such an extent that
the evidence given by them has come to be looked upon with great
suspicion by both courts and juries, and the fact has become
very plain that in any case where opinion evidence is admissible,
the particular kind of an opinion desired by any party to the investigation can be readily procured by paying the market price
therefor.
The immediately apparent answer to such an indictment is that
"the employment of real estate experts in land damage cases, if an
evil, is undoubtedly a necessary one." 9 The wide discrepancy in

valuation figures given by different experts on the same land may
often be explained by considering first that such opinion is neces-

sarily based on many variables, and secondly, by realizing that
experts with an optimistic viewpoint tend to testify for condemnees,
while those with a more conservative outlook support the condemnors. Even though such discrepancies exist, it is far better to
allow men with skill and training in the area to state their opinions
than it is to allow an uninformed guess which "is simply a shot in

the dark-nothing more." 0

All courts now allow real estate experts to state their opinions,

whether the court is favorable to expert value testimony or not.
The weight of the opinion depends on how well it is supported by
facts which the expert gives.1' Detailing such information is a safeguard against the bias of the witness, and it is an intelligent means

of allowing the jury to decide the accuracy of the opinion.'2 The
more relevant detail the witness is allowed to give, the better the
likelihood of a fair and impartial valuation.
THE REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL PROCESS
"Real estate appraising is a service function, often designated
as a profession. This service can be accomplished only through
adherence to basic principles, techniques . . . acceptable to and
understood by appraisers and by the public.' 3 At least, appraising
9 5 NicHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 18.41 (3d ed. 1962).
1l Ibid.

"E.g., Washington v. United States, 214 F.2d 33 (9th Cir. 1954); Webber
v. City of Scottsbluff, 150 Neb. 446, 35 N.W.2d 110 (1948); City of
Denver v. Quick, 108 Colo. 111, 113 P.2d 999 (1941). Cf. Viliborghi v.
Prescott School Dist. No. 1, 55 Ariz. 230, 100 P.2d 178 (1940) (where
detail information was allowed only on cross-examination).
12 State v. Peterson, 12 Utah 2d 317, 320, 366 P.2d 76, 78 (1961): "[If the
information were distorted], the frailty would be subject to exposure
on cross-examination .... It is thus of importance to the court and jury
to know what it was based upon .... "
13 FRIEDMAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISING 17 (1959).
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land is a complicated process requiring utilization of the Cost,
Income, and Market approaches to value. Each of these approaches
is worthwhile and applicable under various circumstances, but a
basic tenet of appraisal practice requires as many of them be applied to a specific piece of property as the nature of the property
permits. The ultimate valuation is determined by comparing the
results of each of these techniques. In order to determine what
detail is relevant to support an expert's opinion, it is necessary to
briefly examine each of the three valuation methods.
COST APPROACH

14

The cost approach, which is applicable to improved land, involves estimating the replacement cost of the improvement at
present market price, less estimated accrued depreciation, plus
estimated land value. This method is particularly useful in valuing
special-purpose and service properties such as churches, schools,
and libraries which have a limited market and produce no income.
The cost approach is also applicable to industrial property that
services a stabilized market. The value of newly built income property, which is not yet producing, such as rental projects, is indicated in the cost figures. This approach is limited, however, as it
does not reflect economic and marketing conditions.
Four basic methods may be used to determine cost. In each of
them the property is broken down into various component units,
which may be either the most basic materials in the structure
(Qualitative method), larger constructed units (Unit-in-place
method), or the number of square feet in the unit (Square-foot
Unit-in-place method), or cubic feet (Cubic-foot Unit-in-place
method). The cost per component part is computed and the figures
are added or multiplied. To this must be added the costs of financing, architects' fees, insurance and permits, taxes, management
and other overhead items. The current costs used in determining
price per component part can be obtained from local contractors,
architects, and engineering firms. But since this is usually expensive and time consuming most appraisers subscribe to various
services that furnish comparative cost data.
INcOME APPROACH 15

The income technique is a mathematical process for converting
present and future income derived from the real estate into present

14 Id. at 37. See Appendix A.

15 Id. at 54. See

Appendix A.
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capital value. This approach is applicable to business, industrial,
agricultural, and residential property presently earning, or reasonably capable of producing income. Economic demand and existing
market conditions are reflected in these figures, which are computed
by the direct, indirect, or residual income methods.
(a) Direct Income Capitalization
Under the direct income approach, present net income is determined by subtracting from gross income the fixed and variable
expenses and losses such as rental vacancy and defaults in collection. The net income figure is then adjusted by the appraiser in
view of environmental and inherent factors to arrive at a net income expectancy figure. Environmental factors include trends in
economic activity, decentralization of the business area, construction costs, supply and demand of mortgage financing, and supply
and demand in the real estate market for the particular type of
property. Inherent factors are the remaining economic life of the
property and its physical condition.
Next, the capitalization rate, the percentage figure used to
convert the expectancy into present dollar value, is applied to the
net income expectancy to give a present dollar value to the property.
The capitalization rate selected must show a reasonable relationship to the property. The rate is usually selected by using the comparative, component, or synthetic rate methods. The comparative
capitalization rate is computed by dividing the sale prices of similar
properties into their respective incomes. A component rate is the
sum of the current safe rate for investments such as indicated by
government bonds, a risk rate which reasonably allows for continued earning ability, a rate reflecting the cost involved in managing the investment, and other factors that happen to be applicable
in a particular case. The synthetic rate is based on mortgages
suitable for the property and the current market demand for return
on equities.
(b) Indirect Income Capitalization
The second major income approach is indirect capitalization.
It is a simplified method for properties such as single family residences, duplexes, boarding and rooming houses. The actual sale
price of similar property is divided by the annual rental income
from them. The average of these figures from similar sales is
computed to give the gross rent multiplier. The multiplier is taken
times the estimated gross rent figure of the subject property to
determine the property valuation. This method is accurate because
it recognizes the relationship between rental and sale prices.
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(c) Residual Income Method
A final variation on the income approach, the residual process
of capitalization, is used when the value of one of the elementsland or improvements-has been accurately determined. The value
of the known element is multiplied by its capitalization rate. This
fig-ure is subtracted from total expected net income to indicate the
income attributable to the unknown element. This resulting figure
is then capitalized to give the present dollar value of the unknown.
MARKET OR COMPARABLE SALES APPROACH 0
The market approach to value is the third basic valuation
method and is used widely in appraising residential and farm lands.
It involves the use of sales of comparable properties as indicative
of the market price of the subject property. The process generally
includes describing and classifying assets, finding sales involving
comparable assets, adjusting sale price for differences in time and
condition, comparing each sold asset with the subject asset, adjusting for differences and estimating indicated market value of the
subject asset in each comparison, and finding the central tendency
of the indicated values. Although this method requires many personal judgments in weighing the various similarities and differences
in the properties, an outside appraiser not previously familiar with
the area market can give an accurate opinion of value. However, to
do so requires, at the minimum, that the appraiser refer to data in
previous appraisals, interview seller and buyer, consult local real
estate agents and brokers, check county records and inspect listings
and offers.
From the professional appraiser's point of view an adequate
real estate appraisal should include the use of all of these outlined
methods, or as many of them as are reasonably applicable. In
business, the Cost, Income, and Market approaches to value are used
by buyers and sellers to determine the fair market price of property.
They constitute the accepted and most reliable methods of valuing
real estate. Despite the widespread use of the appraisal process
in real estate transactions, the Nebraska courts and most other
jurisdictions do not allow the expert witness to testify fully as to
his use of the appraisal process.

OPINION TESTIMONY IN NEBRASKA
In Nebraska, as in other jurisdictions, the question of fair
market value is for the jury to determine, relying most heavily on
16 Id. at 86.
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the opinions of witnesses. The Nebraska Supreme Court has been
quite consistent with respect to the requirements for qualification
and the use of testimony of opinion witnesses in condemnation
cases. The earliest cases took the position that a person who is
17
familiar with the land was qualified to state his opinion of value.
This rule was modified to require that the witness also be familiar
with the local real estate market. 8 These requirements are easily
met since testimony that the witness has resided in the area for a
period of time, and the mere statement that he is familiar with the
land and market establishes these elements prima facie. 9 The expert, who has not lived in the area, is also allowed to testify if he has
familiarized himself with the land and market.20 There are no
distinctions between the opinion testimony of the layman and the
expert, since the court holds that the weight of the testimony is
21
for the jury.

When no particular weight is given to the witnesses' testimony,
the amount of detail given to support the opinion becomes vitally
important. The greatest controversy in Nebraska arose over the use
of comparable sales as a basis for opinion. For many years Ne-

17 Wahlgren v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 139 Neb. 489, 297 N.W. 833

(1941); Baltimore & M. R.R. v. Schluntz, 14 Neb. 421, 16 N.W. 439 (1883);
Republican Valley R.R. v. Arnold, 13 Neb. 485, 14 N.W. 478 (1882) overruling Fremont E.&M.V. R.R. v. Whalen, 11 Neb. 585, 10 N.W. 491 (1881).
18 O'Neil v. State, 174 Neb. 540, 118 N.W.2d 616 (1962); Medelman v.
Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 518, 52 N.W.2d 328 (1952);
Langdon v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 142 Neb. 859, 8 N.W.2d 201
(1943), aff'd on rehearing, 144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d 168 (1944).
19 fDevore v. Board of Equalization, 144 Neb. 351, 13 N.W.2d 451 (1944);
Langdon v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 142 Neb. 859, 8 N.W.2d 201
(1943), aff'd on rehearing, 144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d 168 (1944); Chicago
B. & Q. R.R. v. Shafer, 49 Neb. 25, 68 N.W. 342 (1896); Northeastern Neb.
R.R. V. Frazier, 25 Neb. 53, 40 N.W. 609 (1888).
20
0'Neil v. State, 174 Neb. 540, 118 N.W.2d 616 (1962); Timmonds v.
School Dist. of Omaha, 173 Neb. 574, 114 N.W.2d 386 (1962); Devore v.
Board of Equalization, 144 Neb. 351, 13 N.W.2d 451 (1944); Langdon v.
Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 142 Neb. 859, 8 N.W.2d 201 (1943), aff'd on
rehearing,144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d 168 (1944) ; Beebe & Runyan Furniture
Co. v. Board of Equalization, 139 Neb. 158, 296 N.W. 764 (1941).
21 State v. Wixson, 175 Neb. 431, 122 N.W.2d. 72 (1963); Medelman v.
Stanton-Pilger Drainage Dist., 155 Neb. 518, 52 N.W.2d 328 (1952);
Langdon v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 142 Neb. 859, 8 N.W.2d 201
(1943), aff'd on rehearing, 144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d 168 (1944); Wahlgren
v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 139 Neb. 489, 297 N.W. 833 (1941);
Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Shafer, 49 Neb. 25, 68 N.W. 342 (1896).
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braska followed the New York rule, 22 allowing no direct examination on comparable sales either as supporting detail or substantive
evidence, because it would introduce collateral issues. 23 This posi24
tion was reversed in Langdon v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist.
where the court did allow testimony of comparable sales on direct
examination, if sufficient foundation was laid to show the similarity
between the other land sold and the land in question. Once the
similarity of the properties has been shown, evidence of sales is
admissible over objections of hearsay evidence. 25 Therefore, both
lay and expert witnesses may rely on such sales to form the basis
of their opinions.26 On cross-examination, the witness's qualifications and the detail supporting his opinion may be liberally inquired
into for the purpose of discrediting his opinion, but not to introduce
substantive evidence as to the value of the land.2 7 As this discussion
indicates, the Nebraska court has recognized the importance of the
Market approach to value.
While it is well settled that comparable sales may be used
either as foundation for the witness or as detail testimony, no rules
have been set down regulating the minimum amount of knowledge
of the land that is necessary. 28 Another question left open by a
recent decision is whether the expert may use, as detail, sales not
sufficiently similar to be admitted as substantive evidence. 29
Although the use of testimony of the market approach, or comparable sales, is well established, the same is not true of the other
two basic approaches to valuation. There appear to be no decisions
regarding the competency of testimony on the cost of replacement.3 0
22

Meehan v. Kaufman, 222 App. Div. 456, 226 N.Y. Supp. 734 (1st Dep't
1928) (holding admission of evidence of similar sales was reversible
error).
23 Swanson v. Board of Equalization, 142 Neb. 506, 6 N.W.2d 777 (1942);
Rushart v. State, 142 Neb. 301, 5 N.W.2d 884 (1942), citing authorities.
24 142 Neb. 859, 8 N.W.2d 201 (1943), aff'd on rehearing, 144 Neb. 325,
13 N.W.2d 168 (1944).

City of Lincoln v. Marshall, 161 Neb. 680, 74 N.W.2d 470 (1956).
26
Langdon v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 144 Neb. 325, 338, 13 N.W.2d
25

168, 175 (1944).

Johnson v. Airport Authority, 173 Neb. 801, 115 N.W.2d 426 (1962).
28 Notes 16-20 supra. See Appendix B for suggested foundational questions.
29 O'Neil v. State, 174 Neb. 540, 118 N.W.2d 616 (1962). For cases in other
jurisdictions see note 43 infra.
80 Cf. Chicago B.&Q. R.R. v. Shafer, 49 Neb. 25, 68 N.W.342 (1896) (where
court mentioned, as partial qualification of witness, that he knew value
of improvements).
27
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A few decisions do exist on the use of income to determine market
value.31 The general rule appears to be that any evidence relating
to income is inadmissible. 32 The ruling is based on the view that
income is often attributable to the skill and industry of the owner,
and reflects very little about the actual value of the land. Two
exceptions to this rule are recognized. First, rental income may be
introduced as evidence, 33 because it reflects value of the land and
improvements actually attributable to the land itself. The second
exception allows evidence of income and profit in determining the
value of a leasehold. 34 This is admissible since the consideration
paid for the lease often depends on the income-producing ability of
the property. Since these two exceptions apply in only a limited
number of cases, the value of the land is primarily determined
through the use of opinion testimony on comparable sales alone.

James Poultry Co. v. City of Nebraska City, 135 Neb. 787, 284 N.W. 273
(1939); Fremont, E. & M.V. R.R. v. Bates, 40 Neb. 381, 58 N.W. 959
(1894); See also, Snyder v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist.,
144 Neb. 308, 13 N.W.2d 160 (1944).
32
Papke v. City of Omaha, 152 Neb. 491, 41 N.W.2d 751 (1950); James
Poultry Co. v. City of Nebraska City, 135 Neb. 787, 284 N.W. 273 (1939);
Snyder v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 144 Neb. 308, 13
N.W.2d 160 (1944); Fremont, E. & M.V. R.R. v. Bates, 40 Neb. 381, 58
N.W. 959 (1894). Cf. State v. Wixson, 175 Neb. 431, 122 N.W.2d 72
(1963), where action of trial court granting new trial on basis of excessive verdict was reversed at 441 the court observed: "The plaintiff
argues that an average net income of $3,550, over a period of three
years, based upon a valuation of $30,000 and with no amount charged
by defendant for wages, is indicative of the fact that the verdict was
excessive. The net income of the defendants was slightly in excess
of 10 per cent, considered upon a $30,000 valuation. While there is
no evidence that defendant took wages out of the business and considered profits over and above the wages, certainly the defendant
could run their business as they chose. In any event, the above matters
appear in the record and might have been argued to the jury and considered by the jury. (Emphasis added.)
33
Fremont, E & M.V. R.R. v. Bates, 40 Neb. 381, 58 N.W. 959 (1894). The
court allowed admission of statement by owner that since the taking
he had received less grain rent because the land was less productive.
Citing other jurisdictions the court said: "The cases cited all refer to
31

money rent, but we think the principle is the same . . . and applicable

to the evidence in reference to rent in the case at bar." Id. at 393, 58
N.W. at 963.
34 James Poultry Co. v. City of Nebraska City, 135 Neb. 787, 284 N.W.273
(1939), allowed no evidence of profits. The decision was modified on
rehearing to allow evidence of past profits as tending to show the value
of the leasehold, 136 Neb. 456, 286 N.W. 337 (1939).
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OPINION TESTIMONY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
To qualify as an opinion witness in other states, the witness
must show that he has means for forming his opinion beyond that
held by men generally, or that he is sufficiently well informed to
be helpful to the jury.35 These requirements are met, as in Nebraska, by proving that the witness is familiar with the property
in question and the market. 36 Both real estate experts and laymen
may qualify to testify to the value of the land whether it be rural
or urban.37 Some courts hold the view that laymen are perhaps
more qualified to testify to the value of farm land in their own
community than the most competent outsider.38 In respect to urban
land the courts allow a presumption that land owners in the area
are qualified to testify.39 The courts are divided on whether any
witness, lay or40expert, may rely on hearsay knowledge in foundational matters.
It is important to keep in mind the differences between the
requirements for qualifying the witness, and the rules regarding
detail of testimony to support the opinion. In other jurisdictions,
as in Nebraska, the greatest controversy over detail relates to the
use of comparable sales. Only one court still follows the old New
York rule that no evidence of comparable sale is allowed on direct

35

United States v. 13,255.53 Acres of Land, 158 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1946);

Welch v. TVA, 108 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1939); Trunkline Gas Co. v.
O'Bryon, 21 Ill. 2d 95, 171 N.E.2d 45 (1960).
36Montana Ry. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348 (1890); United States v. Nickerson,
2 F.2d 502 (1st Cir. 1924); Board of Park Comm'rs v. Fitch, 184 Kan.
508, 337 P.2d 1034 (1959); Massie v. City of Floydada, 112 S.W.2d 243
(Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
37 HI.
Supply Co. v. United States, 194 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1952); Welch
v. TVA, 108 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1939); Shelby County v. Baker, 269 Ala.
111, 110 So. 2d 896 (1959); Mitchell v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 299 S.W.2d
183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); Stevenson v. East Deer Township, 379 Pa.
103, 108 A.2d 815 (1954).
38
Montana Ry. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348 (1890); Welch v. TVA, 108 F.2d
95 (6th Cir. 1939); Board of Park Comm'rs v. Fitch,. 184 Kan. 508, 337
P.2d 1034 (1959); Baker Metropolitan Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Baca,
138 Colo. 239, 331 P.2d 511 (1958).
39
Brown v. Town of Eustes, 293 Fed. 197 (S.D. Fla. 1923); Board of Park
Comm'rs v. Fitch, 184 Kan. 508, 337 P.2d 1034 (1959); People v. Willis,
30 Cal. App. 2d 419, 86 P.2d 670 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
40United States v. 5139.5 Acres of Land, 200 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1952);
City of Denver v. Quick, 108 Colo. 111, 113 "P.2d 999 (1941); Redfield v.
Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 251 Iowa 332, 99 N.W.2d 413 (1959);
Stewart v. Commonwealth, 337 S.W.2d 880 (Ky. App. 1960).
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examination. 41 At the least, all other courts allow experts to testify
42
to comparable sales, and many allow such testimony by laymen.
One question on which there is very little case law, and which may
become an important area of controversy, is whether experts may
rely on comparable sales as supporting evidence43 if the sales have
been ruled inadmissible as substantive evidence.
There is no consistent pattern in the decisions as to what
distinctions will or will not be drawn in a particular jurisdiction.
For example, the Kentucky court 44 has held that evidence of comparable sales was competent and probative. The evidence could not
be based on hearsay, however, unless the witness was an expert,
in which case it could be used either as qualifying foundation or as
detail basis for his opinion. In contrast, Iowa 45 held that comparable
sales could be used as supporting or substantive evidence by experts
on direct examination. With respect to laymen, however, sales
could be used only to test their competency on cross-examination.
A number of jurisdictions have recognized the importance of
the cost approach to value, although it is not supported by as large
a body of law as the market approach. 46 The courts are divided on

41

Luecke v. State Highway Comm'n, 186 Kan. 584, 352 P.2d 454 (1960).
For cases adopting majority view see County of Los Angeles v. Faus,
48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957); Redfield v. Iowa State Highway
Comm'n, 251 Iowa 332, 99 N.W.2d 413 (1959); In re Civic Center, 335
Mich. 528, 56 N.W.2d 375 (1953). For compilation of cases on comparable
sales see Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 110 (1962).
425 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 21.3 (3d ed. 1962).
43
United States v. Certain Interests in Property, 186 F. Supp. 167 (N.D.
Calif. 1960); People v. Gangi Corp., 15 Cal. Rep. 19 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961),
rev'd, 57 Cal. 2d 346, 19 Cal. Rptr. 473, 369 P.2d 346 (1962).
44 Stewart v. Commonwealth, 337 S.W.2d 880 (Ky. App. 1960). See also
Commonwealth v. Citizen's Ice & Fuel Co., 365 S.W.2d 113 (Ky. App.
1963).
45
Redfield v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 251 Iowa 332, 99 N.W.2d 413
(1959). Compare Langdon v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 142 Neb.
859, 8 N.W.2d 201 (1943), aff'd on rehearing, 144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d
168 (1944), which allowed laymen and experts to testify to sales either
as supporting or substantive evidence, even if gained from hearsay
source.
46
Hanson Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 581 (1923); Stevenson Brick Co. v.
United States ex rel. TVA, 110 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1940); County of Cook
v. Colonial Oil Corp., 15 Ill. 2d 67, 153 N.E.2d 844 (1958); State v. Red
Wing Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 253 Minn. 570, 93 N.W.2d 206 (1958).
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whether cost data is admissible in all instances, 47 or only when no
evidence of comparable sales is available.48 Standing alone, valuation based on cost tends to be misleading since the figures reflected
are inflationary in nature. Therefore, cost figures are considered
to set the highest limit of value for the property and a condemnation
award should never exceed them. 49 Such figures are important,
however, since they reflect differences in improvements that can
be only estimated by the market approach.
Both federal and state courts have specifically held that loss
of business profits is not compensable in condemnation proceedings,50 because the business itself has not been taken and it may be
moved elsewhere. Evidence of business profits, as tending to show
the value of the land, is inadmissible since the profits are attributable more to the industry, skill, and personality of the owner. In
addition they are too uncertain to form a basis for compensation.
Several major exceptions have been made in cases where the income
is clearly attributable to the land rather than the owner. In many
states either the productivity of the business,51 or the income from
farm crops 52 is admissible as tending to show the value of the land,
but not as separate items of damage. The value of peculiar enter-

47 State v. Red Wing Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 253 Minn. 570, 93

N.W.2d 206 (1958).
United States v. Benning Housing Corp., 276 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1960).
49 Ibid.
5
0 Backus v. Fort St. Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557 (1898); United States v.
Meyer, 113 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1940); Wilson v. Iowa State Highway
Comm'n, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161 (1958); Amory v. Commonwealth,
321 Mass. 240, 72 N.E.2d 549 (1947). A leading case in the area, Gauley &
E. Ry. v. Conley, 84 W. Va. 489, 494, 100 S.E. 290, 292 (1919) stated:
"The true reason may be that presumptively the world affords the
trader just as good opportunities in other places, and the inconvenience
and expense of finding another location are incidents of the business,
and not elements of damage to the property condemned ......
See discussion in 22 MONT. L. REV. 80 (1960).
51 St. Louis Housing Authority v. Bainter, 297 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1957);
City of Denver v. Quick, 108 Colo. 111, 113 P.2d 999 (1941).
52 Cases on admission of evidence of rents and profits are collected in 65
A.L.R. 455 (1930). Cases on admission of evidence of income from farm
products are collected in 16 A.L.R.2d 1113 (1951). Compare Korf v.
Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W.2d 85 (1948) (allowing evidence of present and past crop values as tending to show value of leasehold), with
Wilson v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 249 Iowa 994, 90 N.W.2d 161
(1958) (holding farm owner's statement of net monthly income inadmissible).
48
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prises such as franchises for toll roads may be based entirely on
53
income figures.
Perhaps the most important exception to the rule excluding
income evidence is the admissibility of rental income. 54 The courts
consider that the rent paid actually reflects the quality, suitability,
adaptablity, and location of the land. Rental income, by itself, may
be admissible,55 or it may be capitalized 56 as tending to show the
value of the land. While the vast majority of cases allowing evidence of rental income are based on actual rental figures for the
land, Texas 57 has allowed hypothetical inference of rental value to
stand as evidence of land value when there was a partial taking
from the owner. Under such a practice, if reasonably accurate
rental value before and after taking can be determined, it will
reflect the injury to the land in income figures, without compensating for lost profits.
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
In Nebraska, where testimony is limited to comparable sales
and occasionally rental value or past profits in leaseholds, the use

Chestnut Hill & Spring House Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Montgomery County,
228 Pa. 1, 76 Atl. 726 (1910).
54
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Demetria
Sifuentes v. United States, 168 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1948); State v. Crockett,
134 So. 2d 341 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Bergeman v. State Rds. Comm'n
of Maryland, 218 Md. 137, 146 A.2d 48 (1958).
55
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Spitzer v.
Slickman, 278 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1960); Lebanon & Nashville Turnpike
Co. v. Creveling, 159 Tenn. 147, 17 S.W.2d 22 (1929).
56 State v. Clarke, 135 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 1961); State v. Crockett, 134
So. 2d 341 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Burritt Mut. Say. Bank v. City of New
Britain, 20 Conn. Supp. 476, 140 A.2d 324 (C.P. 1958); Winepol v. State
Rds. Comm'n of Maryland, 151 A.2d 723, 725 (Md. Ct. App. 1959):
"[C]apitalization of the income which a property will produce is relevant
and pertinent evidence of its value to a willing purchaser. .. "
57 City of Dallas v. Priolo, 150 Tex. 423, 242 S.W.2d 176 (1951). Cf.
Herdon v. Housing Authority, 261 S.W.2d 221 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953);
State v. Parkey, 295 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (limiting use of
rental income to cases of partial taking). Compare State v. Peterson,
134 Mont. 52, 328 P.2d 617 (1958) (where court allowed evidence of net
profits of business located near highway). Criticised in 22 MONT. L. REv.
80 (1960). See also, Note, 66 Dicx L. REv. 453, 465 (1962), suggesting that
the profit and loss statement of a business is always considered by a
willing buyer.
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of the expert is severely restricted. Relying on the premise that
accurate real estate valuation requires consideration of as many of
the three elements of value as are applicable, it is obvious that the
present rules of evidence are too narrowly drawn and that important areas of economic influence are ignored.
It is true the expert may testify to the effect of comparable
sales on the value of the land in question, but so may any layman
residing in the area. Any special credence given to the expert must
come from his own reputation and his ability to detail his analysis.
If admissible detail is limited to comparable sales, an expert using
the proper valuation techniques may have unexplainable discrepancies in his analysis which can be used to discredit him on
cross-examination. In addition, cases may arise where no sufficient
evidence of comparable sales is available.58
It is certainly not contended that appraisal of value is an exact
science. But the expert, through study and detailed analysis of the
real estate market possesses a special skill that enables him to draw
reasonable conclusions from the data he has compiled. The psychiatrist, sociologist, criminologist, and members of the physical sciences are allowed to rely on experience and discipline in their fields.
They are allowed to rely on hearsay evidence and to detail important considerations used by them in drawing conclusions because
such evidence can aid the jury in reaching accurate determinations
of fact. The value expert should be given similar latitude in testimony in order to aid the jury.59
Evidence of reproduction costs tend to be misleading because
of its inflationary nature, but with proper instructions to the jury
68 United States v. Benning Housing Corp., 276 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1960),
where condemned property was privately owned and governmently
regulated Wherry rental housing project. For interesting examination
of Wherry Housing condemnation including capitalization of controlled
rents, reproduction costs, and the possible existence of a national real
estate market see Likins-Foster Monterey Corp. v. United States, 308
F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1962); Fairfield Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 306
F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1962).
59 State v. Arnold, 218 Ore. 43, 341 P.2d 1089, 1102 (1959): "A perusal
of the journals published by the appraisal profession makes it clear
that the qualified members of that profession must have a rather extensive and technical knowledge in their field. It is not unlike the type of
special knowledge which elevates other recognized specialists into the
class of experts." See also, Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 105 Colo. 366, 98 P.2d 283 (1940) (holding appraiser
was within statute regulating expert witness fees and overruling previous decision).
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there is no reason why a man qualified to draw conclusions from
the figures should not be allowed to do so. This is true not only in
cases where no evidence of comparable sales exists, but in any
proceeding where the economic effect on the land is important. In
particular cases improvements may add nothing to the value of the
land. If, for example, the improvement is in a deplorable condition,
or a reasonable use for the structure no longer exists, consideration
of replacement cost would be unwarranted.60
In Nebraska the value of land is to be determined by considering all possible uses."' Taken literally, this would necessitate considering its use as an income producing property. It is unreasonable
to allow evidence of rental value being paid and to consider this
effect on the value of the land as a whole and then ignore any income effect on land not being presently rented, for all possible uses
are not being considered. The same is true of rules allowing evidence of past profits to show the value of a leasehold, but not a
freehold. In market transactions, the willing buyer and seller take
income into consideration in either case. Rules on admissibility of
evidence should be expanded to allow use of the income approach
commensurate with the effect of income on market price.
Furthermore, rental and past profit figures are not presently
capitalized in Nebraska. 62 They stand as naked figures from which
it is difficult to draw conclusions as to the effect on value. Use
of capitalization rates would allow the expert to reasonably explain
income effect, and would allow opposing counsel and the jury to
examine the accuracy of the conclusions.

In re City of New York, 198 N.Y. 84, 86-87, 91 N.E. 278, 278-79 (1910):
"In some cases the value of expensive structures may not enhance
the value of the land at all. An extremely valuable piece of land
may have upon it cheap structures which are a detriment rather than
an improvement. A man may build an expensive mansion upon a
barren waste, and, in such a case, the costly building may add little
or nothing to the total value. In the greater number of cases, however,
the value of the buildings does enhance the value of the land. ... It
must follow that such differences contribute in varying degrees to the
enhancement in the value of the land, and we can think of no way in
which they can be legally proved except by resort to testimony of
structural value, which is but another name for cost of reproduction,
after making proper deductions for wear and tear."
61 O'Neill v. State, 174 Neb. 540, 118 N.W.2d 616 (1962); Lynn v. City of
Omaha, 153 Neb. 193, 43 N.W.2d 527 (1950).
62 James Poultry Co. v. City of Nebraska City, 136 Neb. 456, 286 N.W. 337
(1939); Fremont, E. &M.V. R.R. v. Bates, 40 Neb. 381, 58 N.W. 959 (1894).
0o

COMMENTS
Expansion of rules on admissibility of evidence by allowing
reproduction cost and capitalized income figures would certainly
present some trial difficulties. The question of the relevancy of any
particular fact must be ruled on by the court, weaknesses in analysis
must be ferreted out by the opposing counsel, and the ultimate determination of the weight of the evidence must be made by the
jury. Collateral issues would be raised as to the proper cost indexes
and depreciation formulas to apply in fixing replacement cost, the
amount of income attributable to the land, and the reasonableness
of the capitalization rate.
Collateral issues are also raised at the present time by allowing evidence of comparable sales, but the courts have allowed the
evidence, nonetheless, because experience shows that comparable
sale prices are important in determining value.0 3 However, experience in real estate transacions has also shown that evidence
limited to comparable sales is complete and accurate only when
the properties are identical. The difference of price between two
properties depends on their incomparable features, the quality and
usefulness of the improvements, and the advantages of location
and adaptability for various income producing projects. These incomparable features can be adequately considered by expanding
64
the rules of evidence despite the accompanying difficulties.
No exact formula can be set down for determining the procedure to be followed in admitting evidence of income and replacement cost. For example, income figures for leaseholds may. be
computed on the basis of actual payment by the lessee, or past or
anticipated profits. Rental income might be determined on the
basis of actual rent payment or on the basis of an average value
computed from similar properties. Income producing property
actually rented may be viewed in the light of comparable rental
properties, or on the basis of the percentage of anticipated income
that the investor would be willing to pay for rental of the property.
All of these methods require the use of more or less speculative

63 Langdon v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 142 Neb. 859, 8 N.W.2d 201

(1943).
64 In City of La Grange v. Pieratt, 142 Tex. 23, 28, 175 S.W.2d 243, 246

(1943), the court stated: "Profits which would have been earned by an
established business, absent any interference therewith, are in their
very nature more or less conjectural, uncertain, and speculative, but
this does not deprive the party injured by such interference of his right
to recover. In other words, the difficulties which may lie in the way of
making proof will not defeat a recovery."
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figures, but the market itself operates on these figures. The success
of our economy can be partly attributed to the accuracy that does
exist in the use of the appraisal process in business transactions.
CONCLUSION
Whether the expert is considered a person whose testimony
is to be viewed with suspicion, or as a skilled witness who is able
to appreciably aid the jury, allowing the witness to detail his
analysis by testifying to replacement cost or capitalized income
will be advantageous. Opposing counsel may extensively crossexamine to expose carelessly or fallaciously employed techniques
and figures, and the jury can fully view the basis for the witness's
opinion and not be restricted to the present fragmentary account.
No comparative advantage for either the condemnor or condemnee
would result, for the valuations would not be uniformly higher or
lower. The result would be a more accurate land valuation process.
No serious obstacle to implementing the changes suggested would
be caused by stare decisis, for the modifications would affect only
trial procedure in which there is no problem of detrimental reliance
on prior decisions. Recognition of existing appraisal processes by the
courts, and the admission of more evidence to support the opinion
of the expert will work to the disadvantage of no party, but will
assist in seeing that the condemnee does receive just compensation.
Richard P. Nelson '64
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APPENDIX A
REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL FORMULAS
COMPUTATION USING COST APPROACH

1. Unit cost X No. of units = Base Cost
2. Base cost + Financing + Architect's fees + Overhead - Actual
cost of improvement

3. Actual cost -Accrued

depreciation + Land value = TOTAL

EVALUATION
COMPUTATION USING INcoM APPROACH

1. Direct Income Capitalization
A. Gross income - Expenses and losses - Net income
B. Net income + (-) Environmental and inherent factors NET INCOME EXPECTANCY
C. Capitalization rate
Current income of similar property
Sale price of similar property
or
(2) Safe rate of investment + Risk rate + Management cost
rate
(3) Current return on applicable mortgage financing
D. Net income expectancy X 100 = TOTAL EVALUATION
Capitalization rate
2. IndirectIncome Capitalization
A. Sale price of similar properties = Gross rent multiplier
Rental incomes of sale properties
B. Gross rent multiplier X Rental income of subject property =
TOTAL EVALUATION
3. Residual Income Method of Capitalization
A. Net income expectancy (Value of known element X
capitalization rate) = Income attributable to unknown
B. Income attributable to unknown X 100 = Value of unknown
Capitalization rate
C. Value of unknown + Value of known = TOTAL EVALUATION.
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APPENDIX B

FOUNDATION FOR INTRODUCTION OF COMPARABLE SALES
The present rules in Nebraska prescribe no particular knowledge that is necessary to qualify a witness to testify to the value of
the land in question and to compare it with similar sales. The following questions are suggested as covering the minimum amount of
knowledge that any witness should have before the jury is allowed
to consider his testimony.*
1. Have you in your appraisal of the
property considered
sales of other property and compared these properties to the
property?
2. Would you state the sale that you have considered, giving the
name of the Seller and the name of the Buyer?
3. Would you state the date this property was sold?1
4. What is the location of this property with reference to the
property?
5. Would you describe this property and compare it to the
property?
6. Describe this property and compare it with the
property including comparison of buildings, if any, land quality.
etc.

2

* Compiled by E. E. Christensen, Chief Attorney, Right of Way Division,

Department of Roads, State of Nebraska. (Citations added.)
'The date of sale is important in determining whether the sales are sufficiently contemporary to afford a basis for comparison. See Timmonds v.
School Dist., 173 Neb. 574, 114 N.W.2d 386 (1962); Papke v. City of
Omaha, 152 Neb. 491, 41 N.W.2d 751 (1950); City of Lincoln v. Marshall,
161 Neb. 680, 74 N.W.2d 470 (1956).
2 Property must be shown to be sufficiently similar to afford a basis of
comparison. Admission of the evidence is within the discretion of the
trial judge. Redfield v. Iowa State Highway Comm'n, 251 Iowa 332,
341, 99 N.W.2d 413, 418 (1959): "'Similar does not mean identical, but
having a resemblance; and property may be similar in the sense in
which the word is here used though each possesses various points of
difference.' Forest Preserve Dist. v. Lehmann Estate, Inc., 388 Ill. 416,
428, 58 N.E.2d 538, 544. Size, use, location and character of the land, time,
mode and nature of the sale all have a bearing on the admissibility of
such evidence."
See O'Neill v. State, 174 Neb. 540, 118 N.W.2d 616 (1962); Langdon v.
Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 142 Neb. 859, 8 N.W.2d 201 (1943), aff'd
on rehearing, 144 Neb. 325, 13 N.W.2d 168 (1944).

COMIV1NTS
7. Did you investigate the terms of this transaction and talk to
the Buyer, Seller or Real Estate Agent involved?
8. Did your investigation reveal this transaction to be an open
market transaction, in other words between a willing purchaser
and a willing seller?3
9. Did you consider and did you find whether the property was
4
purchased for a specific purpose?
10. What was the sale price?
ADDITIONAL POINTS OF INQUIRY
1. Describe the transaction, whether or not it was a contract for
deed, a cash sale, assumption of mortgage, amount paid down.
2. Did you examine the instrument of sale?
3. Was this property under lease or of particular advantage to
either of the parties?
4. Was the sale price enhanced by reason of the anticipated
acquisition by the Department of Roads of other land?5
5. What was the zoning? 6
6. Did you check the deed record and verify that this was a bona
fide transaction?

3To be admissible a sale cannot have been made under unusual circumstances that would inflate or deflate prices. Lynn v. City of Omaha,
153 Neb. 193, 195-96, 43 N.W.2d 527, 529 (1950): "Individual sales throw
no light on market values if in any sense compulsory ..
1..";
Papke v.
City of Omaha, 152 Neb. 491, 41 N.W.2d 751 (1950).
4 Langdon v. Loup River Pub. Power Dist., 142 Neb. 859, 865, 8 N.W.2d
201, 204 (1943): "To demonstrate nonadmissibility under the rule, let
us say the other lands were purchased for a specific purpose such as a
filling station or some other commercial enterprise not common to the
particular location, and for that reason the purchaser was willing to
pay much more than market or going value."
5Note 3 supra.
O O'Neill v. State, 174 Neb. 540, 118 N.W.2d 616 (1962)
(where expert
was allowed to consider effect of zoning on value).

